Approach

Can you trust the way we build?

Twenty years of building systems that get attacked on day one taught us a handful of things. None of them are principles in the abstract. They are the operating patterns we keep returning to, because they are the difference between systems that hold and systems that fail in the field.

Principles and thesis

Twenty years of building this taught us five things.

Not principles in the abstract. The operating patterns we keep returning to because they are the difference between systems that hold and systems that fail in the field.

01

Adversarial review before launch.

Every product ships under adversarial review before launch. We design as if the system will be attacked on day one, because the systems we build for — importer compliance, fertilizer authenticity, donor verification — are attacked on day one. Security is the first design constraint, not the audit at the end.

02

Field reality over architecture diagrams.

Designs that fail in the village, on shaky 3G, or in a patient's home are failed designs — even if they looked good on paper. We test in the conditions our users actually work in, before we test in conditions we designed for.

03

Vertical literacy at the engineering level.

Our engineers know how an NGO field supervisor logs a household visit, how a care agency confirms a caregiver arrived, how telecom signaling actually behaves under load. The platform is general; the people building it understand the verticals.

04

We stay with the consequences.

We stay with clients for years, inheriting the consequences of our own architectural decisions. The discipline of living with what you built is what keeps the next thing you build honest.

05

We never render an unknown as a pass.

Every claim in anything we build carries the grade of the evidence behind it — self-declared, document-backed, cross-verified, or verified by independent audit with a named auditor and date — and that grade travels with the claim to whoever reads it next. It is also what keeps the AI honest: a model may draft an answer, but it cannot raise the grade of the evidence underneath it.

In practice

What the principles look like on a real build.

Adversarial review. In our healthcare-device security work, every device-to-cloud channel goes through adversarial review before a single unit ships. The threat model assumes the device is already compromised, and the platform is designed to survive that assumption.

Field reality. Field workflows for a national poverty-graduation programme sync opportunistically over 2G and 3G, queue locally for days when they have to, and resolve conflicts at the household level on reconnect. The supervisor reviewing today's visits does not need to know which were captured offline.

Vertical literacy. Engineers on that programme spent weeks shadowing supervisors and field workers before the data model was final. Modelling a visit as a contestable claim rather than an immutable record came from that fieldwork, and it changed how the audit trail was built.

Staying with the consequences. Integration infrastructure we designed more than a decade ago is still running in production, evolved continuously by a team that overlaps substantially with the one that built it.

Security posture

Security is a practice, not a page.

The controls below describe the floor. The principles above describe what we do when no one is auditing.

SOC 2 Type II

In progress · 2026

Security, availability and confidentiality controls audited against the AICPA Trust Services Criteria. Observation window underway.

ISO 27001 aligned

Active

Information security management run to ISO 27001 controls. Formal certification in scope for 2026.

Data residency

Active

Regional residency for EU, US and South Asia deployments. Customer data does not cross regions without explicit configuration.

Encryption

Active

AES-256 at rest, TLS 1.3 in transit, envelope encryption for sensitive fields, and customer-managed keys for regulated tiers.

Access & audit

Active

Least-privilege roles, hardware MFA for production access, immutable tamper-evident audit logs and quarterly access review.

Vulnerabilities

Active

Continuous SAST and DAST in CI, third-party penetration tests annually and before major releases, and a public disclosure programme.

Platform provenance

The platform didn't start yesterday.

Long before SurroundApps was the name on the door, this team was shipping production trust infrastructure at national scale. The deployments below are described, not named, until each client clears it in writing.

Telecom identity, 2010 – 2018. Biometric SIM verification for two of Bangladesh's largest mobile operators, processing millions of subscriber registrations under regulator-mandated KYC. The identity primitives in today's credential issuance trace directly to this work.

Nonprofit audit fabric, 2012 – present. Audit and verification systems for programmes operating across hundreds of field offices, built to hold up under donor review and programme audit. The foundation of Shohay's audit layer.

Healthcare device trust, 2020 – present. Security work on medical IoT and connected devices, where a compromised device is a clinical incident, not a support ticket. This practice feeds Ontor today.

Enterprise delivery standards. Senior engineers on the team came through delivery roles at large US technology and services companies, and carry those operating standards into every build.

Want to evaluate how we'd build your system?

The fastest way to test our approach is to put a real problem in front of us. Bring the messy one: the intermittent connectivity, the audit that has to survive an adversary, the integration the last vendor walked away from.

Start with a diagnostic